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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT OF WITNESS TO COUNSEL 
BEFORE STATE INVESTIGATORY OFFICER-After a fire occurred on the prem-
ises of appellants' corporation, the state fire marshal started an investiga-
tion into the causes of the fire, and subpoenaed appellants to appear as 
witnesses. Ohio law provides that such investigations may be conducted 
in private1 and gives the fire marshal power to punish summarily witnesses 
who refuse to testify.2 Appellants refused to testify without the presence 
of their counsel, who had accompanied them to the place of questioning. 
Appellants were thereafter committed to the county jail by the deputy fire 
marshal who conducted the investigation. On appeal3 from denial of a 
writ of habeas corpus by the Ohio Supreme Court, appellants asserted 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gave them a 
right to have the assistance of their own counsel in giving testimony. The 
appellants disavowed making any direct attack on the fire marshal's power 
to punish summarily. Held, in a five to four decision,4 the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that appellants 
1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1954) §3737.13. 
2 Id., §3737.99(A). 
3 In re Groban, 164 Ohio 26, 128 N.E. (2d) 106 (1955). 
4 Justice Black with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan dissent-
ing. 
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be allowed assistance of counsel in giving testimony 
O
as witnesses at a pro-
ceeding conducted by the state to investigate the causes of a fire. In re 
Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). 
The importance of the principal case lies in the liberal application 
given the due process clause by the four-member minority.5 In the opinion 
of the minority, there is a constitutional right to counsel whenever a wit-
ness would be secretly questioned by a state one-man fact finding body.6 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the state ap-
point counsel for an accused in every criminal prosecution,7 it does require 
that he be permitted to consult with counsel which he has chosen and paid 
for.8 There are substantial differences, however, between that right and 
the right to consult counsel in proceedings like those in the principal case, 
where criminal prosecution would be only a possibility which might 
follow the primary investigation. The investigation, unlike a criminal 
prosecution, could not have determined the ultimate rights of the appel-
lants. More closely analogous to the right asserted in the principal case, 
therefore, is the right to counsel in administrative hearings. Section 6(a) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act,9 applying to federal administrative 
agencies, makes it clear that a witness before federal administrative agen-
cies has the right to counsel. This right, however, is not a requirement of 
due process. Indeed, the inclusion of section 6(a) in the act was considered 
necessary for the very reason that the witness' right to counsel was by no 
means certain under the Bill of Rights.10 A distinction has been drawn 
between the right to counsel in administrative hearings and in administra-
tive investigations. One case, Bowles v. Baer,11 though observing that there 
was a right to have counsel present during questioning of the witness at 
an administrative hearing, distinguished a hearing from an investigation, 
and held that due process was not violated when counsel was excluded 
in proceedings of the latter type.12 This distinction rests upon differences 
in the two types of proceedings. A hearing has adverse parties; issues of 
law and fact are tried; action is taken which may materially affect the 
5 The Court now stands at four and four, Justice Reed, who wrote the majority 
opinion, having retired. 
6 It should be noted that the problem involves not the right to be told of a right 
to counsel nor the right to have the state appoint counsel, but rather the right to utilize 
counsel furnished and paid for by the investigated person himself. 
7 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); 
Ex parte Sullivan, (D.C. Utah 1952) 107 F. Supp. 514. 
8 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 at 9 (1954); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 at 46 (1945); 
Powell v. Alabama, note 7 supra, at 69. 
9 60 Stat. 237 at 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001 et seq. 
10 S. Rep. 111, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1953). 
11 (7th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 787. 
12 Accord, United States v. Levine, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 127 F. Supp. 651; The Golden 
Sun, (S.D. Cal. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 354; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 
149 (1923); United States v. Pitt, (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 169; State ex rel. Tice v. 
Brooks, 160 Kan. 526, 163 P. (2d) 414 (1945); Niznik v. United States, (6th Cir. 1949) 
173 F. (2d) 328. 
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parties to the hearing. An investigation has no adverse parties; issues of 
law and fact are not decided; results are not conclusive.13 (These same 
factors, it will be noted, are pertinent in distinguishing a criminal pro-
ceeding from an investigation.) The rights of the witness before an investi-
gatory tribunal are preserved by his privilege against self-incrimination14 
and by the right to judicial review of any criminal proceedings that should 
result from the investiganon.15 
A situation still more closely analogous to the principal case is that 
of a witness before a grand jury. The majority opinion here points to past 
federal court decisions16 holding that there is no constitutional right to 
counsel during examination of witnesses before the traditional twelve to 
twenty-three man grand jury. The minority, however, seeks to distinguish 
between the traditional grand jury and the one-man board in the principal 
case. The basis for this distinction is twofold. First, the multi-member 
grand jury assures that the witness' rights will be more nearly preserved 
than does the one-man board. The ancient fear of the clandestine inter-
rogation leads the minority to reason that fairness is more easily assured 
when many persons are present than when the entire investigation is in 
the hands of one person. Secondly, the one-man investigation in the princi-
pal case is conducted by a public official charged with administering the 
law. Such an official is less likely to be impartial than a lay grand jury which 
is not charged with administering a particular law.17 Such distinctions 
lead only to the conclusion that to assert, as the minority has in the princi-
pal case, a negative (that there is no right to counsel at the traditional 
grand jury proceedings) to prove a positive (that there is a right to counsel 
in one-man investigatory proceedings) has little logical validity. Further, the 
minority fails to distinguish the problem of the right to counsel from the 
problems raised by secret proceedings in general. It does not follow, as the 
minority contends, that because secret proceedings leave much to be desired, 
there should be a right to counsel in order to overcome such secrecy. The 
defect may be avoided by permitting the attendance of any third party not 
prejudiced against the witness.18 
Unfortunately, counsel for the petitioner in the principal case did not 
allege that the fire marshal's power summarily to punish in private for 
13 In re SEC, (2d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 316. 
14 Omo CONST., art. I, §10; In re Groban, note 3 supra; McCarlhy v. Arndstein, 266 
U.S. 34 (1924). 
15 Niznik v. United States, note 12 supra. 
16 In re Black, (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 542; United States v. Blanton, (E.D. Mo. 1948) 
77 F. Supp. 812. 
17 It is interesting to note that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring in the 
majority opinion, indicate that they might not sustain similar secret questioning by a 
district attorney, who would ,be charged with prosecuting the appellants for any crimes 
discovered. 
18 The Ohio statute in question (see note 1 supra), however, provides that the 
"investigation may be private," and the fire marshal could clearly exclude even dis-
interested third persons if he chose. 
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contempt19 was a violation of the due process requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The one-man investigation is very similar to the 
one-man grand jury system at issue in In re Oliver20 and In re Murchison.21 
In the former case the court squarely held that the secret trial of petitioner 
on charges of contempt violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The petitioner was accorded the right to counsel and a pub-
lic trial. The latter case held that a judge serving as a one-man grand jury 
could not later, in a public hearing, adjudge the petitioner guilty of con-
tempt on charges originating in the secret proceedings over which the same 
judge presided. In both cases the sentencing of the petitioner on charges of 
contempt was set aside. The facts of the principal case are similar enough 
to both cases to assume that the same result would have been reached in 
the principal case had the issue of the fire marshal's power to conduct a 
secret trial for contempt been placed squarely before the court. Although 
it was not, the minority's fear that the state proceedings might become a 
secret inquisition appears primarily to be based on the state official's cumu-
lative power to investigate and, as well, to punish summarily. Without the 
latter power, which if placed in issue would be clearly invalid under the 
reasoning of the Murchison and Oliver cases, the minority's fears appear 
not to be justified. 
10 See note 2 supra. 
20 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
21 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
William G. Mateer, S. Ed. 
